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Abstract
We analyse strategic, complete information, sequential voting with ordinal preferences
over the alternatives. We consider several voting mechanisms: plurality voting and approval
voting with deterministic or uniform tie-breaking rules. We show that strategic voting in
these voting systems may lead to a very undesirable outcome: Condorcet-winner alternative
might be rejected, Condorcet-loser alternative might be elected, and Pareto dominated alter-
native might be elected. These undesirable phenomena occur already with four alternatives
and a small number of voters. For the case of three alternatives we present positive and
negative results.
1 Introduction
Traditionally, most game-theoretic models of voting study voting in a simultaneous setting. The
reason is, no doubt, due to the fact that we perceive confidentiality as a necessary condition for
the fairness of the election process. However, we do see many issues decided upon by means of
sequential voting. In small committees and even in parliaments, sequential, open ballot is often
the default method to make a decision.
When we speak of a possible voting outcome we mean the result when the voting is in an
equilibrium. However, while simultaneous voting translates to a normal-form game and its
solution relies on the notion of Nash equilibrium, the sequential voting translates to an extensive-
form game for which there is the stronger notion of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE).
This equilibrium is guaranteed to always exist, and when the voters’ preferences are totally
ordered, it also leads to a unique outcome.
While on the one hand a lot of work has been done in axiomatic comparison of simultaneous
voting systems (e.g., [9]) and on the other hand there has been interest in sequential voting with
strategic voters (for instance, [7, 5]), the understanding of sequential voting, especially in the
case of more than two alternatives, is very limited. As a first step toward the understanding of
sequential voting, we analyse it in a complete information setting. Though in voting interactions
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with many voters this assumption is unrealistic, in small committees it is more plausible.
The goal of this paper is to understand how good the performance of sequential voting in
scenarios with a small number of voters and a few alternatives (but not necessarily two) is.
We consider a setting of voters who have ordinal preferences over the alternatives. In such a
setting it is not clear how to measure the quality of the elected alternative. However, there are
some scenarios where a) it is clear which alternative is desirable, as for instance, if there is a
Condorcet winner (Definition 2.1); b) it is clear which alternative is undesirable, as for instance,
a Condorcet loser (Definition 2.2) or a Pareto dominated alternative (Definitions 2.3 and 2.4).
We pose the questions: does sequential voting guarantee a choice of a desirable alternative
whenever it exists? Does sequential voting guarantee that an undesirable alternative will not be
elected?
Our results are mainly negative. Although in a two-alternatives setting sequential voting works
perfectly well, already with four alternatives the choice of (rejection of) a desirable (undesirable)
alternative is not guaranteed. In case of three alternatives, we have both positive and negative
results.
1.1 Related work
The field of social choice deals with mechanisms to collect agents’ preferences about different
alternatives, and aggregate them to a single ranking (see the classical works [2] and [8] as well
as the more recent [12]). Among the vast branches of this field is voting theory, which deals
with axioms for ‘good’ voting rules (e.g., [10, 1]) and the analysis of voting mechanisms, scoring
rules and the like (e.g., [9, 11]). In this paper we restrict our attention to voting mechanisms in
which the voters vote sequentially.1
Desmedt and Elkind [7] analyse simultaneous and sequential voting systems employing the plu-
rality voting rule. In their model a voter’s preference is a total ordering of the power set of the
alternatives such that it is consistent with a total ordering of the alternatives themselves; thus
their model accepts draws as a legitimate result. They assume the voters are abstain-biased, i.e.
a voter will not vote unless pivotal. They prove that in a plurality sequential voting with two
alternatives, the winner is the most popular (if one exists), and the voters are truthful whenever
they vote. They then show that these nice properties no longer hold when there are three alter-
natives. For instance, a voter may strategically abstain or vote for an alternative which will not
be selected.
Conitzer and Xia [5] discuss sequential voting under a wide range of voting rules, classified by
their domination-index (defined to be the smallest number such that any coalition of this size
can make any alternative a winner). They prove a general necessary criterion for an alternative
to be a winner, and show a voting scenario with an arbitrary number of alternatives such that
the winner is Pareto dominated by all alternatives but one.
Dekel and Piccione [6], and later Battaglini [3], investigate the information cascade in sequential
voting with two alternatives, and compare its equilibria to the symmetric equilibria of simulta-
neous voting.
1Notice that the term ‘sequential voting’ is often used with respect to a completely different setting, where the
voting procedure is divided into several stages, at each stage the voting is for a subset of the alternatives; see, for
example, [4, 13].
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1.2 Our contribution
In this paper we take a deeper look at the strategic ballots of voters in sequential voting systems.
We investigate three types of paradoxical outcomes, namely — Condorcet winner which is not
elected, Condorcet loser which is elected and Pareto dominated alternative which is elected.
We consider four types of voting systems which are the four combinations of plurality/approval
voting with deterministic/uniform tie-breaking. For each pair of paradox and voting system
we show a minimal example (with respect to the number of alternatives) for which there is a
scenario with this paradox.
2 Model and Definitions
Denote by V = {v1, . . . , vn} the set of voters and by A = {a1, . . . , am} the set of alternatives.
We assume that for any vi ∈ V , his preferences over the alternatives can be expressed as a total
ordering (A,≻vi). We denote by ρ = {≻vi}
n
i=1 the collection of the voters’ preferences, and
call the triplet (V,A, ρ) a voting profile. We assume the voters have complete information. The
voters cast their ballots sequentially and publicly (i.e., each voter knows the ballots of those who
precede him). We consider two types of voting rules:
1.) Plurality voting: each voter, in his turn, votes to at most one alternative (abstentions al-
lowed).
2.) Approval voting: each voter may vote to any subset of the alternatives.
In order for a voting system to be well defined we must also define a tie-breaking rule. We
consider two tie-breaking rules:
1.) Deterministic: there is a predefined total ordering of the alternatives. The elected alternative
is the one that is highest ranked among all alternatives that received the highest number of votes.
2.) Uniform: randomly and uniformly pick a winner from all those who received the highest
number of votes. In this case we assume that each agent tries to maximize the probability of
election of his most favourite alternative and then that of his second-most favourite and so on.
Equivalently, we may think of the result as a ‘winning set’ instead of a winning alternative, and
“lift” the relations of ρ to be relations on the power set of A in the following manner. For any
S ⊆ A let Tvi(S) be the most favourite alternative of vi in S. Then for two non-empty subsets
Sk, Sℓ,
Sk ≻vi Sℓ ⇐⇒
[Tvi(Sk) ≻vi Tvi(Sℓ)] or
[Tvi(Sk) = Tvi(Sℓ) and |Sk| < |Sℓ|] or
[Tvi(Sk) = Tvi(Sℓ) and |Sk| = |Sℓ|
and (Sk − Tvi(Sk)) ≻vi (Sℓ − Tvi(Sk))].
It’s not hard to verify that this relation defines a total ordering.
Thus, we have four combinations of voting rules and tie-breaking rules, which define four dif-
ferent voting systems. Game-theoretically, for a given voting profile and a voting system, we
have a multi-stage game, describable as an extensive-form game — a tree with all possible
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voting-sequences, and an outcome at every leaf. The standard solution for this kind of game is
a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). To find an SPE, we start with the last voter. For every
voting history, we assume this voter will choose a ballot which gives him the best outcome.2
Moving to the next-to-last voter, we know, for every voting history, how the last voter will
respond to any of his ballots. Thus, we can find his best possible outcome for any sequence of
voting history. We can continue this backward process until we find the unique outcome that
can be achieved in a voting sequence in which every voter selects a best ballot.
We now present the paradoxes against which we examine our voting systems. Let (A,≻pw)
be the binary relation defined by the pairwise comparison of alternatives. That is, for any
ai, aj ∈ A
ak ≻pw aℓ ⇐⇒
|{vi ∈ V : ak ≻vi aℓ}| > |{vi ∈ V : aℓ ≻vi ak}|.
An alternative ak is called a Condorcet winner of (V,A, ρ) if it beats pairwise all other alterna-
tives, i.e. if ak ≻pw aℓ, ∀ℓ 6= k.
Definition 2.1. A Condorcet winner paradox is a voting scenario in which a Condorcet winner
of (V,A, ρ) is not part of the winning set.
An alternative ak is called a Condorcet loser of (V,A, ρ) if it loses pairwise to all other
alternatives, i.e. if aℓ ≻pw ak, ∀ℓ 6= k.
Definition 2.2. A Condorcet loser paradox is a voting scenario in which a Condorcet loser of
(V,A, ρ) is the lone winner.
An alternative ak is Pareto dominated by alternative aℓ in (V,A, ρ) if for all vi ∈ V , aℓ ≻vi ak.
Definition 2.3. A Pareto-dominated weak paradox is a voting scenario in which a Pareto
dominated alternative in (V,A, ρ) is part of the winning set.
Definition 2.4. A Pareto-dominated strong paradox is a voting scenario in which a Pareto
dominated alternative in (V,A, ρ) is the lone winner.
When the tie-breaking is deterministic the winning set is always a single alternative; hence
in this case there is no difference between the Pareto-dominated weak paradox and the Pareto-
dominated strong paradox.
3 The Condorcet Winner and the Condorcet Loser Paradoxes
When there are only two alternatives the Condorcet winner and Condorcet loser paradoxes
actually describe the same situation in which an alternative which is the most favourite by a
majority of the voters, is not elected. It is not hard to see that this is impossible in the voting
systems we consider here (see Corollary 1 of [7] for plurality voting). Here we show that already
when there are three alternatives the classical voting systems are no longer resistant to those
paradoxes. In all the examples, we list the voters’ preferences from high to low. We circle the
votes in an SPE.
2Although different ballots might lead to the same outcome, the important thing here is the existence and
uniqueness of the best outcome.
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Claim 3.1. Already with three alternatives, there are examples of the Condorcet winner paradox
and the Condorcet loser paradox, in all of our voting systems.
Proof. Consider the sequential plurality voting scenario in Table 1, which can either be seen as
a five-voter uniform tie-breaking scenario or a four-voter and deterministic tie-breaker (in which
case the last voter is the tie-breaker).
It is easy to verify that A is a Condorcet winner in either case. Since Voter 1 gets his most
preferred outcome, his ballot is best possible. If Voters 2, 3 try to improve the outcome by
voting for A, then Voter 4 will vote for B and since Voter 5 (or the tie-breaker) prefers B over
A, B will be elected. Since B is worse than C for Voters 2, 3, their vote for C is best. Voter 4
cannot change the result since C is most preferred by Voter 5 (tie-breaker).3
The two scenarios shown in Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate a situation where a Condorcet loser wins
the election under the plurality-deterministic and plurality-uniform voting systems. In both of
them C is a Condorcet loser. After the first three voters vote for C, this alternative must be
elected (because C is in top priority of the tie-break in case of deterministic tie-breaking; and in
case of uniform tie-breaking, it is enough that C is in top priority of another voter.). Since C is
in top priority of Voter 2, it is enough to show that voters 1 and 3 cannot get a better results.
In the deterministic scenario, any other vote of Voter 3 will force Voter 6 to join voters 4 and 5
in their vote for A, since otherwise alternative C will be elected by tie-breaking. Voter 1 cannot
get a better result since Voter 2 can vote for B which is a best outcome for voters 3 and 6 and
is preferred by the tie-break over A.
In the uniform scenario, if Voter 3 votes for B, both voters 4 and 5 will vote for A and Voter 7
will be forced to join them to get the outcome {A,C}, which is worse for Voter 3 than just C.
If Voter 1 tries to get A elected, Voter 2 will vote for B and he will be joined by voters 3, 6 and
7 to get B as the lone winner, which is the worst outcome for Voter 1.
Below we analyse the SPEs in the remaining four examples.
A Condorcet winner paradox in approval-deterministic voting (Table 4). Clearly, any ballot
of Voter 4 leads to the election of C. Voters 2, 3 cannot get A elected because B will have the
same number of votes as A, and the tie-breaking gives preference to B. Voter 1 gets his best
outcome, hence the voting is in equilibrium.
A Condorcet winner paradox in approval-uniform voting (Table 5). Any vote of Voter 5
gives the same outcome. Voters 3, 4 cannot get A in the winning set because B will have more
votes than A. Voters 1, 2 get their best result and hence the voting is in equilibrium.
A Condorcet loser paradox in approval-deterministic voting (Table 6). Before the vote of
Voter 5, C has already four voters, thus Voters 5, 6 cannot get a better outcome, even if they
co-operate. If Voters 3, 4 try to get A elected by voting for A and removing one or two of their
votes for C, then Voter 5 will vote for B or for {B,C} so that Voter 6 will be faced with a
choice between B and C.4 Voter 6 prefers B over C, but B is the worst outcome for Voters 3,
4, thus their vote for C is their best choice. Voters 1, 2 cannot get B elected, because Voters 3,
4 and 6 can vote for their most preferred alternative, A, which is also preferred over B in the
3Interestingly, C is Voter 1’s most preferred alternative, but to get it elected he must vote for B — his least
preferred alternative.
4The voting vector before the vote of Voter 6 will be (2, 3, 3) and C is the most preferred alternative in the
tie-breaking order.
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tie-breaking order.
A Condorcet loser paradox in approval-uniform voting (Table 7). Again, the last voter has
no ballot which prevents the worst outcome for him. Voters 5, 6 cannot get A in the winning
set, since alternative B will have more votes anyway. Voter 4 gets his most preferred outcome.
Voter 3 has no good ballot; if, for example, he votes for B, then Voter 4 will simply remove
his vote for B and the rest of the ballots will remain the same. If Voters 1, 2 try to get B in
the winning set by removing their votes for C, alternative A will be the lone winner with the
votes of Voters 3-6; since this is the worst outcome for Voters 1, 2, they are better off with their
current vote.
Voter 1 C A B
Voter 2 A C B
Voter 3 A C B
Voter 4 B A C
Voter 5/Tie-Breaker C B A
Table 1: Plurality voting. A is a Condorcet
winner, C is elected.
Voter 1 A C B
Voter 2 C B A
Voter 3 B C A
Voter 4 A B C
Voter 5 A B C
Voter 6 B A C
Tie-Break C B A
Table 2: Plurality-deterministic voting. C is
a Condorcet loser and gets elected.
Voter 1 A C B
Voter 2 C B A
Voter 3 B C A
Voter 4 A B C
Voter 5 A B C
Voter 6 C B A
Voter 7 B A C
Table 3: Plurality-uniform voting. C is a
Condorcet loser and the lone winner.
Voter 1 C A B
Voter 2 A C B
Voter 3 A C B
Voter 4 B A C
Tie-Break B C A
Table 4: Approval-deterministic voting. A is
a Condorcet winner, C is elected.
Voter 1 C A B
Voter 2 C A B
Voter 3 A C B
Voter 4 A C B
Voter 5 B A C
Table 5: Approval-uniform voting. A is a
Condorcet winner, C is elected.
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Voter 1 B C A
Voter 2 B C A
Voter 3 A C B
Voter 4 A C B
Voter 5 B A C
Voter 6 A B C
Tie-Break C A B
Table 6: Approval-deterministic voting. C is
a Condorcet loser gets elected.
Voter 1 B C A
Voter 2 B C A
Voter 3 A B C
Voter 4 C A B
Voter 5 A C B
Voter 6 A C B
Voter 7 B A C
Table 7: Approval-uniform voting. C is a
Condorcet loser and the lone winner.
4 Pareto-efficiency
The following Pareto-dominated paradox scenario for the plurality-deterministic voting system
was demonstrated in [5]. Suppose we have one voter with preference order A ≻ C ≻ B and
another voter with preference B ≻ A ≻ C. Furthermore, assume the tie-breaking order is
C ≻ B ≻ A. The first voter should not vote for A as that would lead to the election of B which
is his worst outcome. He therefore votes for C, which is elected. Notice that A Pareto dominates
C in the voters’ preferences, but the tie-breaking order gives preference to C over A. We claim
that the plurality-deterministic voting system is the only one of our four voting systems which
allows this paradox with only three alternatives.
Proposition 4.1. Let S be a voting system with three alternatives and at least two voters. If S is
approval voting with either tie-breaking rules, or it is plurality voting with uniform tie-breaking,
then the Pareto-dominated weak paradox cannot happen.
Proof. Assume that we have a voting scenario with alternatives {A,B,C} and C is Pareto
dominated by A. For X ∈ {A,B,C}, we call a voter which has X at the top of his preference
order an ‘X-type’ voter. Since C is Pareto dominated, there are only A-type and B-type voters.
Now, in any voting system, if there is a strict majority of X-type voters then they all just vote
for X in an SPE (since then X is elected alone and that’s the best possible result for them).
We therefore assume that there is exactly the same number of A-type and B-type voters. If
the tie-breaking is uniform then when all voters vote for their top alternative we get an SPE
with the result {A,B}, and no voter can get a better result. The remaining case is when S
is approval-deterministic. Assume for contradiction that C is selected in an SPE. Since all the
B-type voters rank C last, any other outcome is better for them. This means that every votes
of the B-type voters leads to the election of C. We may assume then, that all the B-type voters
vote just for B. Since half of the voters are B-type, it must be that the tie-breaking prefers C
over B. Now assume that all the B-type voters vote just for A. It must be that no A-type voter
votes for A, otherwise A would have got more than half of the votes and get elected. Moreover,
since there the same number of A-type and B-type voters, it must be that all the A-type voters
vote for C. Let vi be the last A-type voter. Assume that vi adds A to his ballot and votes for
{A,C}. This cannot be a best vote, as explained above. The outcome after this vote must be
B, since this is the only outcome which is worse than C for this voter. But this is not possible
since we already saw that the tie-breaking order prefers C over B and there cannot be more
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votes for B than for C (since we assume that all the A-type voters already voted for C). We
have reached a contradiction, which means that C does not get elected in an SPE.
As mentioned above, there is an example of a Pareto-dominated paradox with three alter-
natives when the voting system is plurality-deterministic. The next claim, then, settles the
question of Pareto-efficiency for the systems with deterministic tie-breaking.
Claim 4.2. If there are at least four alternatives, then there are examples of the Pareto-
dominated paradox for the approval voting system with deterministic tie-breaking.
Proof. In the scenario of Table 8 C is Pareto dominated by A. The first two voters vote for
{C,B} thus creating a threat on Voters 3 and 4 that if they don’t vote for C as well, then B
will be elected. If Voters 1 and 2 change their vote (for example, for {A,B}), then Voter 3 will
vote for {D,A}, Voter 4 will vote for D and Voter 5 will be forced to vote for D as well, making
D the winner.
Voter 1 A C B D
Voter 2 A C B D
Voter 3 D A C B
Voter 4 D A C B
Voter 5 B D A C
Tie-Break D A B C
Table 8: Approval-deterministic voting. C is
Pareto dominated by A and gets
elected.
Claim 4.3. If there are at least four alternatives, then there are examples of the Pareto-
dominated weak paradox for both plurality and approval voting systems with uniform tie-breaking.
Proof. We start with the plurality-uniform voting (Table 9). Voters 5, 6 cannot get a better
outcome, even if they co-operate. Voter 4 must vote for C in order to force Voters 5, 6 to vote for
A.5 If either Voter 2 or Voter 3 change their ballots, Voter 4 will not be able to force Voters 5,
6 to vote for A; instead, Voters 4, 5 and 6 will vote for B which will lead to a worse outcome
for Voters 2, 3. If Voter 1 change his voter, for example for A, then the rest of the voters will
all vote for their top alternative, which would lead to the outcome {A,B,D}, which is worse for
Voter 1.
In the case of approval-uniform voting (Table 10). Voter 5 votes for both A and C so that
Voter 6 is not able to get B in the winning set, and thus is forced to vote for A. Voter 4 has
no vote which changes the outcome in his favour. Voters 2, 3 cannot get D in the winning set
because of the threat of Voters 4, 5 and 6 to vote for B. Voter 1 must vote for C and allow it
to be part of the winning set, since this is what allows Voter 5 to force Voter 6 to vote for A as
explained above.
5A vote for A will lead to the outcome {A,B,C} which is worse for him.
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Voter 1 A B D C
Voter 2 D A C B
Voter 3 D C B A
Voter 4 A B D C
Voter 5 B A D C
Voter 6 B D A C
Table 9: Plurality-uniform voting. C is
Pareto dominated by D. The win-
ning set is {A,C}.
Voter 1 A B D C
Voter 2 D C B A
Voter 3 D C A B
Voter 4 B D C A
Voter 5 A B D C
Voter 6 B D A C
Table 10: Approval-uniform voting. C is
Pareto dominated by D. The win-
ning set is {A,C}.
The question of whether systems with uniform tie-breaking are weakly Pareto-efficient re-
mains open.
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